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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A
n analysis of  two recent employment-related decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court finds that 
the two holdings neither expanded the scope of  accommodation required for certain special 
employee situations nor did they clarify the complex and conflicting statutes and regulations 
regarding employee accommodation. In the case of  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Court 
disturbed a long-standing precedent regarding accommodations of  pregnant employees under civil rights law 
by essentially turning each case into one where the facts of  the situation must be tried under a challenging 
new standard. In the second case, E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., the Court sidestepped the question 
of  the extent to which an employer should go to accommodate a religious belief, but affirmed an obvious civil 
rights principle that an employer cannot discriminate in a hiring decision based on the assumption that an 
employee would seek accommodation for religious observances.
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Favor of  Employees  
in the Young and Abercrombie Cases:
What Do They Really Hold?
Two recent decisions by the U.S Supreme Court have been characterized as “losses” for employers, and “wins” for employees who wish to have workplace accommodations due to their particular situations. Those perceptions are demonstrated in the popular press reports regarding the decisions, shown in the sidebar on the next page. While the employee 
indeed prevailed in both of  those Supreme Court holdings, neither one indicates that the sky is falling for 
employers nor that nirvana has been reached for employees. Instead, the Young and Abercrombie decisions are 
so narrow that it is nearly impossible to determine what they really stand for. With that in mind, the purpose 
of  this article is to dispel any myths regarding these cases, to set forth a detailed analysis of  the Supreme 
Court’s holdings, and to outline how employers should react, subject to advice of  counsel.
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The two cases we analyze here are Young v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc.1 and E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.2 Both 
cases concerned an employee’s workplace accommodation, and 
in each case the employee prevailed, albeit for very different 
reasons. 
Young
The Young case deals with pregnancy accommodations. It 
hinges on UPS’s policy of  offering light duty to employees 
who: (1) were hurt on the job; (2) lost their Department of  
Transportation certifications to operate a vehicle; or (3) had dis-
abilities covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
With regard to point 1, the company did not offer light duty to 
employees who were hurt outside of  work (e.g., slipping in the 
shower, carrying a child) or who could not lift due to pregnancy. 
Based on the perception that there are no issues of  material 
fact to be decided, the district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of  UPS, and the Court of  Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision. However, Young 
argued that some employees who did not fit into any of  the 
three categories listed above did, in fact, receive an accommoda-
tion. Such an allegation, if  it has any merit, makes summary 
1 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015).
2 135 S.Ct. 2028 (2015).
judgment inappropriate. Since facts were at issue, it was logical 
for the Supreme Court to overturn the decisions of  the lower 
courts. The Supreme Court’s opinion, however, did not stop 
there. Instead of  simply remanding the case, the Supreme Court 
provided guidance on the law. Unfortunately, as explained more 
fully below, the guidance did not really provide much clarifica-
tion, but did lead to misperceptions.
The Parties’ Positions 
The employer and the employee, as is to be expected, argued 
two different interpretations of  the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act (PDA) requirements with regard to accommodations. The 
first clause in the statute, which was not in contention, states that 
discrimination because of  sex includes discrimination because 
of  pregnancy.3 That much is clear. Employers cannot fire, refuse 
to hire, fail to promote, or demote a woman because she is preg-
nant. Such actions would violate Title VII’s prohibition against 
sex discrimination. The case hinged on the second clause in the 
PDA, which is much less clear: “[W]omen affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the 
same for all employment-related purposes…as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”4 
The employee argued that the employer must provide ac-
commodations to pregnant women if  it provides such accom-
modations to anyone with a similar inability to work. In other 
words, accommodations, whether mandated under the ADA or 
provided as part of  a Workers’ Compensation plan, would now 
have to be available to pregnant employees. This would be the 
case even if  other employees (e.g., those with non-work, non-
ADA injuries) do not receive accommodations.
As to be expected, UPS argued that this interpretation 
did not accurately reflect the language of  the statute. Instead, 
UPS argued that the term “shall be treated the same… as other 
persons not so affected…” means that employers can have dif-
ferent policies for different types of  injuries and people as long 
as there is a facially neutral policy. In other words, a policy that 
allowed for accommodations for work limitations caused by 
ADA disabilities and Workers’ Compensation injuries, but did 
not provide for accommodations for limitations necessitated by 
off-the-job injuries or pregnancy would be lawful.
EEOC’s Regulation Changes
To make matters more complex, in 2014 the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency that enforces and 
promulgates rules on how to comply with the discrimination 
laws, made a major change or, depending on one’s point of  view, 
a clarification. However, this rule making took place after the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the Young case.
The 2014 rule making represented a further step for earlier 
guidelines. After the PDA went into effect in 1978, the EEOC 
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
4 Id.
Popular reports regarding the 
Abercrombie and Young holdings
Politico: The Supreme Court ruled Monday against the 
retailer Abercrombie & Fitch, 8-1, deciding that the 
company’s failure to accommodate a job applicant who 
wore a hijab violated civil rights law.1 
The EEOC: EEOC General Counsel David Lopez hailed the 
decision. “At its root, this case is about defending the 
quintessentially American principles of religious freedom 
and tolerance,” Lopez said. “This decision is a victory for our 
increasingly diverse society and we applaud Samantha 
Elauf’s courage and tenacity in pursuing this matter.”2
The Guardian: At the crux of Young’s case is whether or not 
employers should allow for temporary assignments when 
workers are restricted from certain tasks due to pregnancy.3
1 www.politico.com/story/2015/06/ambercrombie-fitch-
hijab-case-supreme-court-ruling-118492#ixzz3n8W0YEeq.
2 www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-1-15.cfm
3 www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/25/us-su-
preme-court-ups-pregnancy-discrimination-suit
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not occur. According to the Supreme Court, the EEOC issued 
the new regulations after the Court agreed to hear the Young case, 
thereby undermining the regulations’ validity and the EEOC’s 
credibility. Moreover, the government had, in the past, argued 
the UPS interpretation of  the regulations. Because the EEOC 
failed to explain the basis for its new regulation and, specifi-
cally, why it conflicted with the government’s previous position, 
the Supreme Court stated it could not rely significantly on the 
EEOC’s determination. 
The Young Holding
The question the Supreme Court addressed was fairly straight-
forward: Do pregnancy limitations require the same accom-
modations as the ADA (which are clearly required by law) and 
any other accommodations given to any employees with work 
limitations caused by medical conditions or may employers 
refuse such accommodations as long as some other group is not 
being accommodated?
In addressing this matter, the Supreme Court could have 
done one of  three things: (1) focus on the facts; (2) make a clear 
ruling of  law; or (3) address the conflict, but not give a clear 
answer. In terms of  setting precedent, the first option would 
be the worst, the second the best, and the third would lead to 
confusion. The Supreme Court chose the third option. 
The reason that focusing on the facts would have been the 
worst choice is that the factual issues here are fairly straightfor-
ward. Young argued that some employees who did not fall into 
any of  three categories above were still given light duty, while 
pregnant women were denied such accommodations. If  Young’s 
assertions are accurate, this is likely a clear case of  discrimina-
tion because pregnancy is being treated differently than other 
causes of  work limitations not set forth in the policy. As stated 
above, since this question of  fact is not resolved, summary judg-
ment is inappropriate, and the case needs to be remanded to 
determine whether Young is correct. If  she is, then there is no 
guidance. If  she is wrong, then the question is one of  law: the 
Supreme Court would have not given any guidance, and the 
case would begin all over again.
The second option would be best because it would provide 
clear guidance for employers: (1) either pregnancy is equal to 
the ADA in that employers must accommodate unless the ac-
commodation creates an undue hardship, and any accommoda-
tions for any employees with medical work limitations must be 
applied to pregnancy; or (2) employers can distinguish between 
the cause of  the injury (i.e., on the job versus off the job) and 
employers must treat pregnancy like any other short-term dis-
ability. While employers and employees may disagree over which 
outcome is best, we contend that clarity always trumps uncer-
tainty. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court gave us uncertainty.
In trying to create some kind of  middle ground, the Su-
preme Court created an issue of  fact for every case, and disturbed 
a long-standing precedent. The Young decision initially follows 
issued a guideline stating: “Disabilities caused or contributed to 
by pregnancy…for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the 
same as disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical 
conditions.”5 Furthermore, the regulations stated: “If  other 
employees temporarily unable to lift are relieved of  these func-
tions, pregnant employees also unable to lift must be temporarily 
relieved of  the function.”6 
This 1978 statement by the EEOC, however, does not 
resolve the discrepancy between the employer’s and the 
employee’s positions. One could read it as standing for the 
proposition that an employer that accommodates any work limi-
tation caused by a medical condition must also accommodate 
pregnant employees. Such a reading seemingly conflicts with the 
first part of  the regulation stating that pregnancy needs to be 
treated like other medical conditions. Employers who allowed 
light duty for “on the job” injuries and thus denied light duty to 
pregnant employees would seemingly be in compliance with the 
first part of  the regulation. If  so, the phrase “other employees 
temporarily unable…” could be read as “other employees whose 
limitations are caused by disabilities in the same category as 
pregnancy” (i.e., non-work-related injuries). In that case, policies 
that provided some light duty, but not for all disabilities, includ-
ing pregnancy, could be lawful.
In contrast, the EEOC’s 2014 regulations are clear: 
An employer may not refuse to treat a pregnant 
worker the same as other employees who are similar 
in their ability or inability to work by relying on a 
policy that makes distinctions based on the source of  
an employee’s limitations (e.g., a policy of  providing 
light duty only to workers injured on the job).7 
The EEOC also provided an example of  disparate treatment 
that would violate the act:
An employer has a policy or practice of  providing 
light duty, subject to availability, for any employee 
who cannot perform one or more job duties for up 
to 90 days due to injury, illness, or a condition that 
would be a disability under the ADA. An employee 
requests a light duty assignment for a 20-pound 
lifting restriction related to her pregnancy. The 
employer denies the light duty request.8 
The EEOC further eliminated any ambiguities in its regulations 
by adding, “an employer may not deny light duty to a pregnant 
employee based on a policy that limits light duty to employees 
with on-the-job injuries.”9 
The EEOC’s clarified regulations could have settled the 
issue in Young if  the Supreme Court had adopted them. That did 
5 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b).
6 29 C.F.R pt. 1604, App., p. 918.
7 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §626–I(A)(5), p. 626:0009 (July 2014).
8 Id. at 626:0013, Example 10.
9 Id. at 626:0028.
6 The Center for Hospitality Labor and Employment Relations  • Cornell University
the well-established McDonnell Douglas framework. Under that 
precedent, the employee must prove that: (1) she is pregnant; 
(2) she sought an accommodation; (3) she was denied an 
accommodation; and (4) the employer accommodated other 
employees similarly situated in their ability or inability to work. 10 
Then, the employer can produce a legitimate, non-discriminato-
ry reason for denying the accommodation. Finally, the employee 
may (if  possible) then prove that the employer’s legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.11 
Under this framework, for decades, employers have generally 
defended claims of  discrimination by providing a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the action that the plaintiff claims 
was discrimination. 
In this framework, limiting accommodations to work-
related or ADA disabilities would not be unlawful. However, the 
Supreme Court moved beyond the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
Instead, the Court stated that the employer’s reason for not 
adding pregnancy to its list of  covered disabilities cannot be 
based on cost or convenience. While such a statement seems 
reasonable, the Supreme Court has never before qualified the 
employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason in this manner. 
Indeed, lower courts throughout the country have held that 
courts should not act as a “super personnel department” or 
“second guess” an employer’s legitimate business justifications.12 
The Supreme Court’s “cost or convenience” edict certainly 
adds a new layer to the analysis. Under this approach, the em-
ployer must explain why it limited the eligible accommodation 
conditions and justify its reasoning. If  costs or convenience will 
10 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
11 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1354.
12 See, e.g.: Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(“This Court does not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines 
an entity’s business decisions.”); Chiarmonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., 129 F.3d 
391, 400 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, —U.S.—, 118 S.Ct. 1795 (1998) (“This 
Court has established that it “does not sit as a super-personnel department 
that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.’”); Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 
1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that employment discrimination statutes do 
not “entitle courts to “sit as super-personnel departments,’ second-guessing 
the wisdom of  businesses’ personnel decisions.”); Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 
1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Courts refuse to sit in judgment as super-person-
nel departments overseeing corporate decisions, even if  some judges think the 
decisions to be mistaken or perplexing or silly.”); Day v. Johnson, 119 F.3d 650, 
657 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, —U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 707, (1998) (“federal 
courts are not self-appointed personnel managers, and they may not second-
guess the fairness or wisdom of  an employer’s nondiscriminatory employment 
decision”); Walton v. Bisco Indus. Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1997) (“we 
do not view the discrimination laws as vehicles for judicial second-guessing 
of  business decisions.); Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853, 865 
(7th Cir. 1997) (“this court “does not sit as a super-personnel department that 
reexamines an entity’s business decisions’”); Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t. of  Correc-
tions, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Even if  a court suspects that a job 
applicant “was victimized by poor selection procedures’ it may not “second-
guess an employer’s personnel decision absent demonstrably discriminatory 
motive.’”); and Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 537 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(“Courts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits—or 
even the rationality—of  employers’ nondiscriminatory business decisions.’”).
not justify distinguishing pregnancy, then what will? Further-
more, the Supreme Court created a challenging standard: 
We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on 
this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the 
employer’s policies impose a significant burden on 
pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently 
strong to justify the burden, but rather—when con-
sidered along with the burden imposed—give rise to 
an inference of  intentional discrimination.13
There are two major problems for employers with this 
statement. First, as stated above, the rationale for the employer’s 
non-discriminatory decision is now at issue. Instead, the ques-
tion should be: Is the purpose of  the employer’s decision to 
discriminate? If  so, guilty, and if  not, not guilty. Second and 
far worse, the last part of  the statement creates a standard that 
will be difficult to navigate: “reasons are not sufficiently strong 
to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with 
the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of  intentional 
discrimination.”14 
Here is why this will be a challenge. Assume that an 
employer has a policy that limits accommodations to on-the-job 
injuries and ADA disabilities. Say further that the employee 
proves that this policy burdens her greatly as she cannot work 
and needs the money. That certainly would be an easy matter 
for an employee to demonstrate. The employer’s reason for the 
policy is that the ADA requires accommodations, and the em-
ployer’s workers’ compensation carrier provides a discount on 
its insurance premiums for providing light duty. (It’s also worth 
noting that many employers are small and cannot afford to pay 
employees who cannot do their job.) 
Unwinnable. From a legal standpoint under the new 
standard, employers can never win this contest. Because costs 
cannot justify a policy, the Supreme Court would find that the 
employer here discriminated (due to cost). But the employer 
did not in fact discriminate. Instead, it followed the law of  
the ADA and took advantage of  the discount provided by its 
insurance carrier. How can that be considered discrimination 
when employees who get hurt playing a sport or who choose to 
donate bone marrow or a kidney to a loved one would also not 
be accommodated under this policy? It is one thing to require 
accommodations and hold an employer liable for failing to 
provide such. It is another issue to state that an employer who 
establishes a policy based on costs and perceived fairness is to be 
considered guilty of  pregnancy discrimination—a reprehensible 
act, if  true. 
From a practical standpoint, this standard makes even less 
sense. Say that the employee proves that such a policy burdens 
her. The question now becomes does such a policy justify the 
13 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1354.
14 Id. 
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burden? How does an employer know whether the benefits of  its 
policy outweigh the burden on a specific employee? If  the policy 
is based on cost, the Supreme Court’s decision means that the 
employer will lose. If  it’s not a cost issue, the issue becomes a 
jury question, based on the Court’s statement. 
In fact, it seems that all policies that exclude pregnancy 
accommodations are now jury questions. If  so, the costs of  a full 
trial will, 99.9 percent of  the time, exceed the cost of  any one 
accommodation. Unless the employer believes it will soon have 
a pregnancy epidemic, it will never make sense to litigate the 
case. The practical impact is that pregnant employees will be 
treated more favorably than other employees seeking accommo-
dation. The holding, however, does not end there.
Employers and their counsel should be ready for lawyers 
representing employees in all types of  discrimination cases to 
use this balancing approach whenever feasible. It would not be 
surprising to start seeing employees using cost or arguing that 
the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was not 
“sufficiently strong” to justify the burden on the employee in 
cases alleging discrimination based on race, age, national origin, 
and the like. If  this concept is applied elsewhere in Title VII, 
it could forever tip the balance in favor of  the employee and 
upend decades of  law relied on by employers.
That said, it does not appear that the is sky falling or that 
employees won across the board with regard to accommoda-
tions. Since pregnancy accommodations are, for all intents and 
purposes, short-term accommodations, and because the ADA 
has expanded coverage to include other short-term disabilities, 
the additional burden is likely not that great, and from a good 
will standpoint, it seems like the right thing to do. 
Nevertheless, the case leaves a question open. What if  the 
employer does not provide light duty to anyone? Light duty is 
not required under the ADA unless it’s reasonable, not an undue 
hardship, and the employer provides it for others. Employers 
who do not have light duty for anyone now should not have to 
do it only for pregnant employees. There is nothing in this case 
that disputes this conclusion, except that the “new” interpreta-
tion of  McDonnell Douglas creates new questions, but no clear 
answers.
Lessons of  Young. Before we move on to the Abercrom-
bie case, let’s look at what employers should do in the wake 
of  Young. It’s time to review policies. If  the employer has light 
duty—expand it to include pregnancy. If  the employer does not 
have light duty and sees it as a true burden, do not let a workers’ 
compensation carrier attempt to start such a program to save 
workers’ compensation premiums at the expense of  the prover-
bial slippery slope. As long as the company does not provide 
light duty to anyone, it should be able to avoid it for ADA and 
pregnant employees. This statement, however, is a “should,” not 
a “will,” and you will need to check with counsel if  you get such 
a request.
Abercrombie
The second accommodation case, E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc., is another example of  the EEOC attempting to 
expand employers’ obligations to accommodate employees—in 
this instance, for religious observance. The Supreme Court 
ruled for the employee in this case, but in doing so did not really 
expand the law. 
The Law of  Religious Accommodation
Any analysis of  the Abercrombie case has to begin with Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,15 the Supreme Court’s 40-year-old 
decision on religious accommodations. Hardison, the employee, 
was a Jehovah’s Witness who worked in building 1 at the job site, 
where he had enough seniority to be able to practice his religion 
by not working weekends.16 After transferring to building 2, 
however, he was second from last in the collectively bargained 
seniority pool. Hardison was then scheduled to work on 
Saturdays when a fellow employee was on vacation. Hardison 
requested an accommodation to observe his Sabbath. 
Hardison proposed four different options for his proposed 
absence: (1) overrule the seniority system; (2) have a manager 
perform Hardison’s tasks; (3) work with one fewer person; or 
(4) have an employee work overtime. The last three options 
would result in a four-day work week for Hardison. After stating 
that the union refused to allow the company to override the se-
niority system, TWA contended that the work was essential and 
could not be performed by a supervisor nor could it not be per-
formed at all (as would occur with a short-staffed crew). Thus, 
the only way to get the job performed and not have Hardison 
work was to have the company pay overtime wages. TWA re-
fused to do that and scheduled Hardison to work on a Saturday. 
When Hardison did not report to work, TWA fired him.
Then and now, Title VII of  the Civil Rights Act requires 
that an employer make reasonable religious accommodations 
to its employees, as long as an accommodation does not result 
in an “undue hardship” for the employer.17 The question before 
the Supreme Court in Hardison was relatively simple: Was the 
accommodation reasonable and not an undue hardship?
Before analyzing the Supreme Court’s holding, one must 
remember this was 1977, and there was neither an ADA nor a 
body of  law with regard to accommodations under the statute. 
The Rehabilitation Act of  1973, a precursor to the ADA, was 
in place, but this only applied to government contractors. It 
required reasonable accommodations as long as they were not 
undue hardships. Because it was a relatively new statute, ap-
plied only to government contractors, and was enacted after 
the Hardison case arose, the Supreme Court did not even look 
to how the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue 
15 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
16 The religion’s Sabbath is from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. 
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
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hardship” were applied under the Rehabilitation Act. Instead, 
the Supreme Court simply examined the facts of  the case in the 
context of  undue hardship.
In finding for TWA, the Supreme Court held that “[t]o  
require TWA to bear more than de minimis cost in order to 
give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship” (emphasis 
added).18 This is an extraordinarily low standard, as the cost 
must essentially be negligible. Any cost greater than something 
that can be disregarded is too much to ask of  an employer. 
In the world of  the ADA, no employment lawyer would 
ever advise an employer that in the ADA context the standard 
for undue hardship is de minimis. Even so, if  TWA were still 
flying today, it probably would not argue that paying overtime 
when someone is on vacation would be an undue hardship (even 
if  that amounted to one or two hundred hours in a year), since 
it would allow the employee to hold a job and fulfill his religious 
observances. 
Despite this, Hardison is still good law! Neither the Supreme 
Court nor Congress has overturned Hardison or the de minimis 
standard. The EEOC and plaintiffs’ lawyers, however, have 
been attempting to overcome this and bring religious accommo-
dations to the ADA level for at least a decade.
In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,19 for example, the 
employee was a member of  the Church of  Body Modifica-
tion, which required her to wear facial piercings. The employer, 
however, had earlier implemented a policy prohibiting facial 
piercings besides earrings.20 The case featured a number of  an-
cillary issues—including whether the Church of  Body Modifica-
tion was a sincerely held religious belief, whether facial piercings 
were required by the church, and whether Costco, which offered 
to let the employee cover her piercings or wear clear jewelry, 
offered an acceptable accommodation. These issues were all ir-
relevant because the court, for the sake of  expediency, accepted 
that this was a truly held religious belief  and analyzed the case 
under an accommodation versus hardship standard, after the 
employee argued that the only acceptable accommodation was 
to allow her to wear all her piercings.
Relying on Hardison, the First Circuit Court of  Appeals 
held that requiring Costco to amend or relax its grooming 
policy was more than a de minimis cost on the employer and 
was therefore an undue hardship. The law is therefore clear: 
religious accommodations with respect to hours, appearance, 
and whatever else could be requested need not be granted if  
they impose anything more than the most minimal of  costs on 
the employer. 
The Cloutier holding is muddled for two reasons. First, while 
the law is clear that any sincere religious belief  is protected, one 
18 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. 
19 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004).
20 There was no dispute that the employer implemented its policy with 
no idea that Cloutier’s piercings were a part of  her religious belief.
must wonder if  the tenets of  the Church of  Body Modifica-
tion might have been viewed with some amount of  suspicion. 
Second, unlike in Hardison, the “cost” of  the accommodation is 
difficult or even impossible to quantify—does a nose ring have 
any effect on the business? Appearance policies are difficult to 
square with Hardison because TWA was able to show tangible, 
albeit nominal, financial costs of  accommodation. Appearance, 
however, is an issue as we analyze the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Abercrombie.
Abercrombie Overview
In Abercrombie, the employee, Samantha Elauf, a practicing 
Muslim, interviewed for a job with Abercrombie and Fitch 
while wearing a headscarf. Elauf  did not volunteer an explana-
tion for the headscarf, and the interviewer, Heather Cooke, did 
not ask. Cooke rated Eluaf  high enough to merit a job offer, but 
the company did not offer her a position. The reason for not 
offering the job was that the company had a policy against em-
ployees wearing “caps,” and Cooke assumed that the headscarf  
was a religious obligation that Elauf  would insist on wearing. 
In fact, when seeking guidance from her supervisors about the 
headscarf  and company policy, Cooke stated that she believed 
that Elauf  wore the headscarf  because of  her religion. Randall 
Johnson, district manager, concluded that the scarf  violated the 
company’s “Look Policy,” regardless of  whether it was worn for 
religious purposes or not. 
If  Cooke had asked Elauf  whether she wore the headscarf  
for religious purposes and would not work without it, and if  
the company then refused to accommodate Eluaf, this would 
be a straightforward case. The question for the Supreme Court 
would be simple: Is it a reasonable accommodation and not 
an undue hardship for an employee to be allowed to wear a 
headscarf  or other religious headwear even if  the company has 
a policy against such apparel? Regardless of  the result, employ-
ers would have guidance. Although many commentators have 
reported the decision as if  that were the question, it was far 
more limited than that.
The Limited Supreme Court Holding
Because the employer did not ask about the headwear and 
because the employee did not volunteer any information, the 
Supreme Court answered a different question: Can an employer, 
seeking to avoid accommodating a religious requirement, refuse 
to hire an applicant whom the employer thinks may require a re-
ligious accommodation? The Court’s answer is no. An employer 
may not refuse to hire such an employee. Thus, as the Supreme 
Court stated, an employer cannot refuse to hire an applicant 
because the company inferred that the applicant is an observant 
Jew who cannot work Saturdays and the company does not wish 
to make such an accommodation. This is a different matter 
from refusing to make an accommodation for an employee.
The Supreme Court did not examine whether headwear 
should be accommodated or were an undue hardship, and it 
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is an undue hardship. Neither the majority opinion nor Alito’s 
concurrence separate the analysis into two parts, however. Alito 
simply states the employer must prove undue hardship, while 
the majority opinion collapses the failure to hire and failure to 
accommodate into one allegation and then states that, of  course, 
it is the plaintiff’s burden. 
This is an important distinction, since the outcome of  the 
case may rest on which party bears the burden of  proof.24 This 
is true because in appearance cases it may be impossible for 
an employer to prove that making an accommodation creates 
an undue hardship. Similarly, it will also be impossible for the 
employee to prove an appearance accommodation does not 
cause an undue hardship. Thus, whichever side has the burden 
may be unable to prevail. Who has the burden, at this point, is 
not clear. 
What Employers Can Do 
The EEOC, through regulations and litigation, is clearly at-
tempting to expand religious and pregnancy accommodations 
so that the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue 
hardship” with respect to these protected classes have the same 
or similar meanings as those under the ADA. The reality that 
neither case law nor statutes support such an interpretation is 
not stopping the EEOC, however, and those who refuse to offer 
accommodations may face the commission’s wrath. Indeed, 
in the Abercrombie case, the EEOC litigated on behalf  of  the 
employee. 
Employers must therefore make a cost-benefit analysis. 
Does the benefit of  refusing to accommodate pregnancy and 
religion (in terms of  money saved or brand indemnity, for 
example) outweigh the costs of  litigation, bad publicity, and ill 
will that may accompany such a refusal? If  the benefits of  not 
accommodating are, in fact, high, employers must work with 
counsel to ensure that their religious accommodation policies 
are in accordance with Hardison, and their pregnancy accommo-
dation policies are in accordance with Young. 
Borrowing a page from the ADA, an employer should con-
sider engaging in the so-called “interactive process,” whereby 
the parties discuss possible accommodations and the employer 
can attempt to provide options for the employee. There is no 
authority stating that this is necessary or that it will result in the 
employer prevailing in subsequent court action. Still, the history 
of  the district courts in discrimination cases is that these courts 
are results oriented, and they are more likely to rule in favor of  
employers who are “good actors” attempting to do the right 
thing.” That said, employers who refuse to accommodate must 
be ready to spend time and money to defend their policies.  n
24 See: David Sherwyn and Michael Heise, “The Gross Beast of  Bur-
den of  Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of  Proof  Influences 
Employment Discrimination Case Outcomes,” 42 Ariz. St. L. J. 901 (2010). 
did not address the de minimis standard from Hardison. Instead, 
it simply held that it is unlawful to base a hiring decision on a 
perceived need for an accommodation. The difference is not so 
subtle. Employers cannot refuse to hire an applicant because 
the applicant likely needs an accommodation. Employers may, 
however, refuse to make an accommodation for an employee if  
it is an undue hardship. 
Because it was not answering the relevant question, the le-
gal analysis briefed by the parties and discussed at oral argument 
centered on contentions that were similar to the Young case, but 
in this situation were, at best, misguided. Young involved preg-
nancy accommodation, but Abercrombie involved a discrimina-
tory hiring decision. In that regard, Title VII defines protected 
religion as “includ[ing] all aspects of  religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief.”21 The Court rightly noted that in ad-
dition to being protected against disparate treatment, religious 
practice “must be accommodated.”22
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel Alito contended 
that the Tenth Circuit, which will hear the case on remand, 
must now decide whether accommodating the headwear is an 
undue hardship. There is nothing in the majority opinion that 
conflicts with this statement and, thus, interested observers will 
need to stay tuned to see how the case is finally resolved.
Another Aspect: Burden of  Proof
One last issue that arose out of  Justice Alito’s concurrence is the 
issue of  the burden of  proof, which his statement appears to 
place on the employer. The conflict between the majority and 
Alito shows the uncertainty surrounding the issue. Alito cites the 
statute, which states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer...to fail or refuse to hire...any individual...
because of  [any aspect of] such individual’s...reli-
gious...practice...unless an employer demonstrates 
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to 
[the] employee’s or prospective employee’s religious...
practice...without undue hardship on the conduct of  
the employer’s business.23 
Alito argues that if  an employee requests a religious ac-
commodation, the employer must prove it’s an undue hardship. 
Under the ADA, however, the employee must prove that the 
accommodation is reasonable (i.e., costs of  the accommodation, 
from a societal standpoint, outweigh the benefits). If  not, the 
employer need not provide that accommodation. If, however, 
the employee demonstrates that the benefits outweigh the costs, 
the employer can still prevail by showing the accommodation 
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
22 Abercrombie, 135 S.Ct. at 2033.
23 Justice Alito combined 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) & § 2000e(j).
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